We consider a scenario where several agents express their preferences over a common set of variable assignments, by means of a soft constraint problem for each agent, and we propose a procedure to compute a variable assignment which satisfies the agents' preferences at best. Such a procedure considers one variable at a time and, at each step, asks all agents to express its preferences over the domain of that variable. Based on such preferences, a voting rule is used to decide on which value is the best for that variable. At the end, the values chosen constitute the returned variable assignment. We study several properties of this procedure and we show that the use of soft constraints allows for a great flexibility on the preferences of the agents, compared to similar work in setting where agents model their preferences via CP-nets, where several restrictions on the agents' preferences need to be imposed to obtain similar properties.
Introduction
It is often the case, that a most preferred object must be chosen among a set of objects by a group of agents.
When the set of objects is small, the agents can simply ordered them to express their preferences. However, when the set of objects is very large, this is unfeasible and, unfortunately, this is usually the case in real-life situation, since often objects have a combinatorial structure, that is, each object can be seen as the combination of certain features, where each feature has a set of possible instances.
Fortunately, when the set of objects has a combinatorial structure, we may describe our preference in a compact way, using one of the several formalisms available in the literature, such as soft constraints (Meseguer et al., 2005) and CP-nets (Boutilier et al., 2004) . The aim of such structures is to allow one to express in time and space polynomial in the number of features an ordering over the set of all objects, which may be exponential in such a number.
On the other hand, voting theory (Arrow and amd K. Suzumura, 2002 ) is a very wide research area, between economy theory and operation research, that elections, where voters (that we would call agents) vote by expressing their preferences over a set of candidates (that we would call objects), and a voting rule decides who the winner candidate is. Voting theory provides many rules to aggregate preferences. that takea in input (a part of) the preference orderings of the agents and gives as output the "winner" object, that is, the object that is considered to be the best according to the rule.
The most naive way to use voting rules in our context consists of choosing a voting rule and giving to it what it needs to know about the preference orderings of the agents, then running the voting rule and see what result comes out. This is however not feasible in general. In fact, if the chosen voting rule needs to know a large part of the preference ordering from the agents, it may take exponential time only to give the input to the rule.
A valid alternative is to use the voting rule several times, on each feature of the object set. This approach is certainly more attractive computationally, since usually the number of instances of each feature is small. What can be done in this situation is to study when, even in presence of dependencies among features, voting can be performed on each single feature at a time rather than on complete objects. This study has been done already for CP-nets (Lang and Xia, 2009) , showing that a sequential single-feature voting protocol can find a winner object in polynomial time, and have several other desirable properties, when the CP-nets satisfy certain conditions on their dependencies.
We have undergone the same study for soft constraints. In particular we show that the use of soft constraints allows us to avoid imposing many restrictions on the preferences of the agents. In fact, contrarily to CP-nets, soft constraints are not directional, and thus information can flow from one variable of a constraint to another one without a predefined ordering between them. This allows us to not tie the variable ordering used by the sequential procedure to the topology of the constraint graph of each agent. This makes the approach much more generally applicable. In fact, the tractability assumption over the constraint graphs is similar to the assumptions that CP-nets are acyclic. However, we do not need to impose that the constraint graphs are compatible among them and with a graph structure based on the variable ordering.
Background

Soft Constraints
A soft constraint (Meseguer et al., 2005 ) is a constraint (Dechter, 2003) where each instantiation of its variables has an associated value from a (totally or partially ordered) set which has the structure of a csemiring. A c-semiring is defined by A, +, ×, 0, 1 where A is this set of values, + is a commutative, associative, and idempotent operator, × is used to combine preference values and is associative, commutative, and distributes over +, 0 is the worst element, and 1 is the best element. The c-semiring S induces a partial or total order ≤ S over preference values, where
where V is a set of variables, D is the domain of the variables and C is a set of constraints over V associating values from c-semiring A.
A classical CSP (Dechter, 2003; Rossi et al., 2006) is just a soft CSP where the chosen c-semiring is S CSP = { f alse, true}, ∨, ∧, f alse,true . Fuzzy CSPs (Meseguer et al., 2005) are instead modeled with S FCSP = [0, 1], max, min, 0, 1 . That is, we want to maximize the minimum preference. For weighted CSPs, the c-semiring is S WCSP = R + , min, +, +∞, 0 : preferences are interpreted as costs from 0 to +∞, and we want to minimize the sum of costs.
As an example, consider the following fuzzy CSP where V = {X,Y }, D = {a, b} and C = {c Y , c xy }. Soft constraint c Y is defined over the values of Y and associates preference 0.4 to a and to 0.7 to b. Constraint c xy , instead, is defined over X and Y and associates 0.9, 0.8, 0.7, 0.6 to, respectively, tuples
Two main operations have been defined on soft constraints: combination, denoted with ⊗, and projection, denoted with ⇓. In words, combining two constraints means building a new constraint involving all the variables of the original ones, and which associates to each tuple of domain values for such variables a semiring element which is obtained by multiplying the elements associated by the original constraints to the appropriate subtuples. Considering the example of fuzzy CSP above, we have that c Y ⊗ c XY is a constraint on X and Y associating 0.4, 0.7, 0.4 and 0.6 to, respectively, tuples
Projecting a constraint on a subset variables means eliminating the others by associating to each tuple over the remaining variables a semiring element which is the sum of the elements associated by the original constraint to all the extensions of this tuple over the eliminated variables. For example, constraint c Y ⊗ c XY ⇓ X is a constraint defined only over X associating 0.7 to a and 0.6 to b.
To obtain the solution of an SCSP, we just combine all constraints. Thus, solving an SCSP means inducing an ordering over the set of complete assignments. In the case of fuzzy and weighted CSPs, such and ordering is a total with ties. In the example above, Constraint propagation in SCSPs may be very helpful in improving the behaviour of the search. For some classes of constraints, constraint propagation is enough to solve the problem (Dechter, 2005) . This is the case for tree-shaped fuzzy CSPs, where directional arc-consistency (DAC), applied bottom-up on the tree shape of the problem, is enough to make the search for an optimal solution backtrack-free. DAC is also enough to compute the preferences over the values of the root variable, in dependence of the rest of the problem. That is, DAC is equivalent to combining all constraints and projecting over the root variable.
For the purpose of this paper we note that, if we project the solution of a SCSP over a single variable, we obtain a total order with ties over the values of that variable, where each value is associated to the preference of the best solution of the SCSP having such variable instantiated to such a value. Given an SCSP P and one of its variables v, we will denote as top(v, P) the set of values of v that are assigned the highest preference in such an ordering. In our running example, if we consider c Y ⊗ c XY ⇓ X , the induced ordering over the values of the domain of X is a > b.
Voting Rules
In the classical setting (Arrow and amd K. Suzumura, 2002) , given a set of candidates C, a profile is a sequence of orderings over the set of candidates, one for each voter. Usually, such orderings are total orders, however several extensions have been studied such as when the orderings are partial orders or total orders with ties. Given a profile, a voting rule, also known as social choice function, maps it onto a single winning candidate.
In this paper, we will often use a terminology which is more familiar to multi-agent settings, and we will therefore sometimes call "agents" the voters, "solutions" the candidates, and "decision" or "best solution" the winning candidate.
Some examples of widely used voting rules are: Plurality: where each voter states who the preferred candidate is, and the candidate who is preferred by the largest number of voters wins; Borda: where given m candidates, each voter gives a ranking of all candidates and the i th ranked candidate scores m − i; the candidate with the greatest sum of scores wins; Approval: where each voter approves between 1 and m − 1 candidates on m total candidates; the candidate with most votes of approval wins; Copeland: where the winner is the candidate that wins the most pairwise competitions against all the other candidates.
The research on voting theory has mainly been concerned with the definition of properties of voting systems that are desirable. These properties are desirable also in automated contexts, so we will recall a few of them, since we will later be interested in studying their presence (or absence) in the preference aggregation system we propose:
A voting rule is Condorcet-consistent if, when a candidate who beats every other in pairwise elections (namely, a Condorcet winner) exists, that candidate is always elected; Condorcet winners are unique and may not exist.
• Anonymity: A voting rule is anonymous when the results of an election are the same even if it occurs a permutation on the voters' set.
• Neutrality: a voting rule is neutral when it is anonymous w.r.t. the candidates.
• Monotonicity: A voting rule is monotonic if, when a candidate wins, and a voter improves his vote in favor of this candidate, then the same candidate still wins.
• Strong Monotonicity A voting rule is strongly monotonic if, given a subset of the candidates' set and a modified restricted profile over this subset (where we increase the preferences over the candidates of the subset), the winner of the election over the subset belongs to the subset's candidates or to the winner of the election over the full set of candidates.
• Consistency: A voting rule is consistent if, when considering preferences of 2 disjoint sets of voters -who decide over the same issues and have identical final results -the result obtained by a vote of the joint set of voters is the same as the ones obtained by the disjoint set of voters.
• Participation: A voting rule is participative if, given any profile, and given a new vote over a set of issues by a new voter, the result obtained from the new profile is equally or more preferred by the new voter, who, thus, has an incentive to participate.
• Efficiency (or unanimity): A voting rule is efficient if, given a winner over an election, there's no candidate who is preferred to the winner by all voters.
These properties are present in some of the voting rules defined above. More precisely, all such rules are anonymous and neutral. Moreover, all but Cup are efficient, only Cup and Copeland are Condorcet consistent, and all but Cup and Copeland are consistent and participative.
Soft profiles and Sequential preference aggregation
As noted above, a soft constraint problem is a way to express our preferences over a set of objects with a combinatorial structure. The set of objects over which preferences are expressed is the set of all assignments of all variables of the problem. If we have n variables with m values in each variable domain, this set contains m n objects. In the fuzzy example, each variable assignment is given a preference between 0 and 1, and assignments with a higher preference value are more preferred.
Assume to have a set of agents, each one expressing his preferences over a common set of objects via a soft constraint problem. Since the objects are common to all agents, this means that all the soft constraint problems have the same set of variables and the same variable domains. However, they may have different constraints, as well as different preferences over the variable domains. We will call a soft profile the preference of a set of m agents, identified by a triple (V, D, P): a set of variables V , a sequence D of |V | domains, and a sequence P of m soft constraint problems over variables in V with domains in D. A fuzzy profile is the same as a soft profile, except that the preferences of each agent are modelled via a fuzzy constraint problem.
The idea is to sequentially vote on each variable via a voting rule. We do not restrict to use always the same voting rule for all variables, so we will have a sequence of as many voting rules as the variables in V .
Given a profile (V, D, P), assume |V | = n, and consider an ordering of such variables O = v 1 , . . . , v n } and a sequence of voting rules R = r 1 , . . . , r n . The sequential voting procedure we propose is a sequence of n steps, where at each step i: After all n steps have been executed, we collect the winning assignments in the tuple d 1 , . . . , d n , which will be reported as the chosen assignment for the variables in V . We write
This short description of the sequential voting procedure does not say what it means for an agent to report their preference ordering over the domain of variable v i . In general, since we do not make any assumption on the voting rules r i , the agent needs to provide the rule with a preference ordering over the whole domain of v i . Since this variable can be connected to other parts of the agent's soft constraint problem, in order to report the correct preferences over the domain of v i , the agent needs to consider the influence of the rest of the problem over v i . This means that, in general, the agent needs to compute the projection over v i of its whole soft constraint problem. This is a soft unary constraint over v i , which is the desired preference ordering, to be given to the voting rule.
This task is in general difficult, so it may require exponential time to accomplish it, unless the class of constraint problems used by the agent is tractable. This is for example the case of tree-like shaped soft constraint problems, which are polynomial to solve. Thus, if agents decide to express their preferences via tree-shaped soft constraint problems, at each step of the sequential voting procedure it is polynomial to provide the input to the voting rule relevant for that step.
Condorcet consistency
It is natural to ask ourselves if the result returned by the sequential voting procedure has some relation with what is considered to be most preferred by the agents. In this respect, it is natural to consider the notion of Condorcet winner, which is classical in voting theory.
As defined above, a Condorcet winner (CW) is a candidate which is preferred to any other candidate by a majority of agents. Given a totally ordered profile, as in classical voting theory, there can be zero or exactly one Condorcet winner. In our context, however, since we may have ties in the preference orderings of the agents, there could be more than one Condorcet winner, since several variable instantiations could be considered optimal for a majority of agents. For any voting rule, it is very desirable that it is Condorcetconsistent, that is, that it returns a Condorcet winner if there is one.
First, we define the notion of sequential Condorcet winner (SCW). Given an SCSP Q, we will denote as Q| v 1 =d 1 ,··· ,v h =d h the problem obtained from Q by fixing variables v 1 , · · · , v h to the corresponding values. Let P i denote the fuzzy constraint problem of agent i. Given a soft profile (V, D, P) with m agents and n variables, and an ordering O over V ,
In words, a sequential Condorcet winner is the combination of local Condorcet winners.
If all the local rules are Condorcet consistent, the sequential voting procedure returns a SCW by definition. However, to conclude that Seq is Condorcet consistent, we need to prove that SCW = CW. The following results shows that a CW is always an SCW, but unfortunately the opposite does not hold. 
Theorem 1 Given a soft profile (V, D, P) and an ordering O over V , if d is a CW for (V, D, P), then it is a SCW for (V, D, P). Thus, if Seq is Condorcet consistent, all local voting rules are so.
6. When each agent solves the problem and projects on variable X, for the first two agents we have pre f X (a) = 0.9 and pre f X (b) = 0.8; for the third agent pre f X (a) = 0.9 and pre f X (b) = 0.7; and for the last two agents pre f X (a) = 0.7 and pre f X (b) = 0.9. Thus, 3 over 5 agents agree that X = a is optimal. Since the voting rule r X is Condorcetconsistent, this value will be chosen for X. Given X = a, the preferences of the agents for Y are: for the first two agents pre f Y (a) = 0.7 and pre f Y (b) = 0.9; for the third agent pre f Y (a) = 0.9 and pre f Y (b) = 0.7; for the last two agents pre f Y (a) = 0.7 and pre f Y (b) = 0.6. Thus Y = a will be chosen, since r Y is Condorcet consistent, and (X = a,Y = a) will be the SCW. However, (X = a,Y = a) is not a CW, since the majority of the agents prefers (X = b,Y = b). This means that there could be results of the sequential voting procedure that are not CWs. To make sure that the procedure is Condorcet consistent, we need to impose some restrictions on the profile, similarly to what is done in (Lang and Xia, 2009 ).
Anonymity and Neutrality
It is also important to make sure that a preference aggregation system does not depend on the names or the order of the agents. This corresponds to saying that the rule is anonymous.
In our setting, a permutation of voter set corresponds, basically, to a permutation of the soft constraint problems. It is easy to see that if the sequential voting rule respects anonymity, then also all the local voting rules do so, and, vice versa, if all the local voting rules are anonymous, so is the resulting sequential rule.
Neutrality is a property that requires for a rule to be insensitive to permutations of the candidates. This means that the result does not depend on the names of the candidates, but only on their position in the preference orderings. It is thus very important that a voting system is neutral.
We note that the candidates of the local voting rules are the values in the variable domains, while the candidates of the sequential voting rule are the complete assignments to all variables.
While a permutation of the values in the domains always corresponds to a permutation of the variable assignments, not all of the permutations of variable assignments can be obtained via permutations of domain values. For example, if we have assignments: From this observation it derives that neutrality of the local voting rules does not imply neutrality of the sequential voting rule, while the neutrality of the sequential voting rule implies the neutrality of each local voting rule.
Consistency
As defined above, a voting rule r is consistent if, when considering two profiles P 1 and P 2 with disjoint sets of voters, who vote over the same candidates, such that r(P 1 ) = r(P 2 ), we have r(P 1 ∪ P 2 ) = r(P 1 ). In fact, if all the local rules are consistent, at every step i of the sequential procedure, applied to profile P 1 ∪ P 2 , the result for variable v i is the same as the result in profile P 1 (and also in profile P 2 ), so the overall result (d 1 , . . . , d n ) will be the same as the result obtained by the sequential procedure in profile P 1 and in profile P 2 . On the other hand, if one of the local rules, say r i , is not consistent, then the result of the sequential procedure cannot be the same. ∪ p i,h ).
Let us now consider the soft profile (V, D, P), defined as follows:
• for each agent j = 1, . . . , m, the preferences over the values of v i are as in p i ;
• all other unary constraints are the same for all agents and associate preference 1 to exactly one value per variable and 0 to all other variables. There are no other constraints.
Let us assume that the SCSP P h of agent h is defined as follows:
• his preference over variable v i is p i,h ,
• all other unary constraints associate preference 1 to exactly one value per variable and 0 to all other variables. There are no other constraints.
Note that for each agent j, including h, his preference for any assignment corresponds with his preference on the value assigned to the first variable. Since we have that
On the other hand, it is possible that all local voting rules are participative, but the sequential voting procedure is not so.
Theorem 5 If all the local voting rules are participative, the sequential voting procedure may not be participative.
To see this, consider the profile where V = {x, y}, D = ({a, b, c}, {a, b}) , and P is a sequence of two fuzzy SCSPs which coincide and contain a unary constraint on x (associating preference 1 to a, 0.8 to b, and 0.6 to c), a binary constraint on x and y (associating preference 1 to (a, b), 0.9 to (a, a), 0.8 to (b, a), 0.7 to (b, b), 0.6 to (c, a), and 0.5 to (c, b)), and a unary constraint over y (associating preference 1 to both a and b). It is easy to see that this SCSPs are DAC. Assume also that variables are ordered x ≺ O y and that r 1 is the scoring rule with score vector (3, 2, 0) and r 2 is the majority rule. In this profile, Seq O,R (V, D, P) = (x = a, y = b). We now consider a third voter, with a fuzzy SCSP with a unary constraint on x (associating preference 0.8 to a, 1 to b, and 0.9 to c), a binary constraint on x and y (associating preference 0.8 to (a, b), 0.5 to (a, a), 0.7 to (b, a), 1 to (b, b) , 0.6 to (c, a), and 0.5 to (c, b)), and a unary constraint over y (associating preference 1 to both a and b). In this new profile P ′ , Seq O,R (V, D, P ′ ) = (x = b, y = a). However, the third voter prefers (x = a, y = b) to (x = b, y = a). Thus the third voter would be better off not participating to the sequential voting process. Let us now consider the soft profile (V, D, P), defined as follows:
• for each agent j the preferences over the values of v i are as in p i ; • all other unary constraints are the same for all agents and associate preference 1 to exactly one
